Abstract: Strengthening urban landscape control and highlighting regional characteristics are crucial spatial governance tasks in China. However, impacted by globalization, urbanization, and other multifaceted trends, the phenomenon of a disordered landscape and ineffective control has become prevalent throughout the country. Based on these observations, this paper proposes the framework of 'government-collective dual regulation' and argues that the effectiveness of small towns' landscape control hinges on the outcome of the game between these two regulatory entities. Firstly, it traces back the historical institutional context of the dual regulation environment in small towns. Secondly, adopting a theoretical perspective from new institutional economics and building upon Coase's Theorem and Barzel's Property Rights Theory, it simulates and analyzes three typical scenarios of dual regulation games within the realm of landscape control. Using G Town in Zhejiang Province as a preliminary empirical case study, it is found that the divergence between collective regulation and government regulation intentions in specific affairs at the end of the control transmission chain is the crucial factor leading to ineffective landscape control. Lastly, it extends its considerations to explore the governance approach for optimizing small towns' landscape control in the new era.